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FIRST AMENDMENT FORMALISM IS GIVING WAY TO
FIRST AMENDMENT LEGAL REALISM*
Richard Delgado**
In her article In the Defense of Freedom and Equality,' Professor
Strossen, President of the ACLU, sets out to explain some of the contro-
versies currently flaring, both inside and outside that organization, over
its First Amendment advocacy. To critics who charge that recently the
organization has been balancing its commitment to free speech against its
commitment to other values, she responds that this is nothing new. The
ACLU has always championed these other values, including civil rights
and equality.2 Yet the group is not flagging in defense of free speech,
either. It is near-absolutist about this3-although not single-mindedly so.
4
Is there a conflict between promoting equality and the rights of hate
speakers and pornographers? No, she says,5 but if there ever should be
one, we can accommodate both by choosing the least speech-restrictive
method that will offer the victimized group a degree of protection.
6
Her tone is reassuring and conciliatory. She presents a picture of the
ACLU as a happy family, its internal struggles as healthy disagreement.
Affiliates that have broken with the national position and endorsed cam-
pus speech codes, for example, have in reality not strayed so far.7 The
ACLU is merely adjusting its ground slightly, arranging its position a few
degrees this way or that along the continuum of First Amendment vigi-
lance.
What she says may be true, even laudable, as an attempt to keep the
members of the ACLU at peace with each other and focused on common
goals. But there is another, far more intellectually intriguing explanation
for the rifts and tugs-of-war taking place inside the ACLU over issues
such as pornography and hate speech that are testing the limits of First
Amendment orthodoxy. In this other vision, the skirmishes are not so
much questions of standing one's ground, as some of the old-timers see
* This Article is a response to Nadine Strossen, In the Defense of Freedom and
Equality: The American Civil Liberties Union Past, Present and Future, 29 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 143 (1994).
** Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado; J.D., University
of California-Berkeley.
I Nadine Strossen, In the Defense of Freedom and Equality: The American Civil
Liberties Union Past, Present and Future, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 143 (1994).21d. at 146-47.
3 Id. at 152-53.
4 Id. at 153.
5 1d. at 149-51.
6 See id. at 154.
71d. at 155-56.
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it, or even of refining that ground slightly, as Professor Strossen wants to
make it appear. Rather, the ground itself is shifting. The prevailing First
Amendment paradigm is undergoing a slow, inexorable transformation.
We are witnessing the arrival, nearly seventy years after its appearance in
other areas of law, of First Amendment legal realism.8 The old, formalist
view of speech as a near-perfect instrument for testing ideas and promot-
ing social progress is passing into history.9 Replacing it is a much more
nuanced, skeptical, and realistic view of what speech can do, one that
looks to self- and class interest, linguistic science, politics, and other tools
of the realist approach to understand how expression functions in our
political system. We are losing our innocence about the First Amendment,
but we will all be wiser, not to mention more humane, when that process
is complete.
Early in American history, we thought the First Amendment was the
crowning jewel of our jurisprudence.10 As recently as 1970, prominent
scholars described our system of free expression in sweeping, exalted
terms.II But shortly thereafter some writers began expressing doubts about
whether First Amendment doctrine was capable of delivering on its prom-
ises.' 2 In the last few years, under the impetus of challenges from Critical
Race Theory, Feminist and other writers, the trickle of doubts has turned
into a flood.'
3
The transition to the new paradigm is, however, far from complete.
Those who write in the new tradition still expend much energy defending
it from charges that they are Satanic, forgetful of history, deluded, in
league with fascism, etc.' 4 It is impossible to predict what the new under-
standing of the First Amendment will look like when it is fully mature,
8 On legal realism, see Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought,
in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 13, 21-24 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed.
1990); and Jack Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the
First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375.
9 See infra notes 11-13, 15 and accompanying text.
'0 See Richard Delgado & David R. Millen, God, Galileo, and Government: Toward
Constitutional Protection for Scientific Inquiry, 53 WASH. L. REV. 349, 361-71 (1978).
"E.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970);
Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
878-86 (1963) (setting out functions of the First Amendment-viz., search for truth;
promotion of social change; self-fulfillment of the speaker; etc.).
12E.g., Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE
L.J. 1; Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1992).
13 On Critical Race Theory in general, see Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical
Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461 (1993); on the feminist
critique of pornography, see, e.g., ANDREA DWORKIN & CATHARINE MACKINNON, POR-
NOGRAPHY AND CIVIL RIGHTS: A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN'S EQUALITY (1988).
14 For an example of vituperative writing by a mainstream columnist, see Jonathan
Yardley, The Code Word: Alarming, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1993, at G-2 (describing two
anti-hate speech writers as engaged in "euphemism" "evasion" "pop psychology," "lu-
nacy," "zealot(ry)," "totalitarianism" "phrenology," "Newspeak" "Doublethink" and
more).
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just as the early Realists, seventy years ago, could scarcely have predicted
how their movement would lead the way to clinical legal education,
perspectivism, critical legal studies (CLS), and elite law reviews. With
these cautions, here are what I see as the themes and outlines of the new
conception of the First Amendment. I make no claim to be comprehen-
sive; I am sure my list is personal to me.
First, the paradigm includes an awareness of the First Amendment's
limitations. Early in our history, we made grandiose claims for what the
system of free expression could do. 15 But recently, scholars have shown
that our much-vaunted marketplace of ideas works best in connection with
questions that are narrowly limited in scope. 16 Is this parking space safer
to leave the car in than another? Does a heavy object fall faster than a
light one in a vacuum? Would a voucher school-finance scheme adversely
affect the poor? With such clearly bounded disputes, First Amendment
free speech can often help us avoid error and arrive at a consensus. But
with systemic social ills like racism and sexism, the marketplace of ideas
is much less effective. These broadscale ills are embedded in the reigning
paradigm, the set of meanings and conventions by which we construct and
interpret reality. Someone who speaks out against the racism of his or her
day is seen as extreme, political, or incoherent. Speech is least effective
where we need it most.
17
A second theme of First Amendment legal realism is the under-
standing of the free expression paradigm as a tool for legitimating the
status quo." If, as a starting point, we posit a perfect marketplace of ideas,
then, according to the old paradigm, the current distribution of social
power and resources must be roughly what fairness and justice would
dictate. Our more energetic, European ideas, for example, competed with
others and won in a fair fight. But, of course, it was not fair: communi-
cation is expensive, so the poor are often excluded; the dominant para-
digm renders certain ideas unsayable or incomprehensible; and our system
of ideas and images constructs certain people so that they have little
credibility in the eyes of listeners.' 9
This leads to a third component of the new approach, namely the idea
that language and expression can sometimes serve as instruments of posi-
tive harm. Incessant depiction of a group as lazy, stupid, and hy-
15See supra notes 11-12; see also STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT,
DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 86-109, 140-69 (1990) (re-evaluating these claims).16 See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law
and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1258, 1259, 1275-84 (1992).
17 See id. at 1261, 1275-84 (coining the term "empathic fallacy" to describe belief
that speech can dispel error embedded in one's own speech paradigm).
'8 See Ingber, supra note 12, at 77-85; Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 16, at
1284-88.
19 Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 16, at 1275-88.
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persexual--or ornamental for that matter-constructs social reality so that
members of that group are always one-down. 20 Thereafter, even the most
scrupulously neutral laws and rules will not save them from falling further
and further behind as private actions compound their disadvantage. Affir-
mative action becomes necessary, which in turn reinforces the view that
members of these groups are naturally inferior (because they need special
help). Pornography and hate speech are the two most visible fronts on
which the fight to make the legal order recognize and prevent these harms
is waged, often against great resistance from critics who preach tolerance
of offending speech. But when powerful groups find a particular type of
speech offensive and likely to render them one-down, they pass a law to
curtail it. We rarely notice these "exceptions" and special doctrines, how-
ever, because they are time-honored and second nature. Of course there
would be an exception for state secrets, plagiarism, false advertising, and
dozens of other types of speech, we say. But one to protect seventeen-
year-old Black undergraduates at dominantly white institutions? Oh no,
the First Amendment must be a seamless web.21
The emerging First Amendment realism leads us to notice how even
labeling something a First Amendment problem channels and predeter-
mines analysis. Why, feminists and civil rights activists ask, should I be
a mere compelling state interest in your jurisprudence, and not you one
in my equality-based analysis?22 We are belatedly realizing that treating
hate speech as a First Amendment problem may make as little sense as
treating murder under the commerce clause.
We are beginning to scrutinize such sweeping generalizations as:
speech is minorities' best friend; suppressing racism only causes it to
explode in more virulent forms later; talking back is the best solution to
bigotry and sexism; and tolerating face-to-face insults is necessary to a
university's role as a bastion of free speech and inquiry.23 We are begin-
ning to ask the "who-benefits?" question about free speech and to raise
20 On the way pornography constructs the social reality of women as sexualized, see
generally, Dworkin & MacKinnon, supra note 14; Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic,
Pornography and Harm to Women: "No Empirical Evidence?", 53 OHIo ST. L.J. 1037,
1039-50 (1992).
21 On these "aberrations" and exceptions to free speech (which number in the dozens),
see Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision,
85 Nw. U. L. REv. 343, 377-78 (1991).221d. at 345-48 (noting that the issue of the legitimacy of campus hate speech codes
can be looked at in two ways: as a free speech problem (in which case the advocates of
campus rules must demonstrate that their concerns rise to the level of compellingness), or
as an inequality problem (in which case the advocates of free speech must shoulder the
opposite burden)); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REv.
795 (1993).
23See David Yun & Richard Delgado, Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: An
Analysis of Paternalistic Objections to Hate-Speech Regulation, CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming
spring 1994).
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the possibility that scoundrels and bigots can easily hide under the mantle
of the First Amendment.24 We are questioning whether the continuum of
high-value (viz., normal) and low-value speech may not be all there is.
Could there be no-value speech, or negative-value speech, which not only
could, but should be restricted?
25
We are beginning to flip stock arguments. Until now, the following
argument has been determinative: the First Amendment condemns that;
therefore it is wrong. We are raising the possibility that the correct argu-
ment may sometimes be: the First Amendment condemns that, therefore
the First Amendment (or the way we understand it) is wrong.26 Although
it is often said that free speech is the best protector of equality, perhaps
equality is a precondition of effective speech, at least in the grand, dia-
logic sense.27 We can now take statements such as "The campus ought to
be a bastion of free speech," and render them as, "The campus ought to
be a bastion of equal, respectful treatment' 28 Or, finally, from the old saw
"The cure is more speech," why not, "The cure is more equality?"
We are beginning to realize that even judges who set out to be
scrupulously fair may not be able to balance values in cases, such as those
concerning hate speech, when free speech and another value (say com-
munity) come into conflict. Speech-community is in reality a dyad, not
two separate things that a judge can balance, like Jones' right to build a
fence and Smith's right to have more sun in his living room.
29
On the level of ideas, then, the ground is inexorably shifting. First
Amendment formalism is giving way to First Amendment realism. The
ACLU's own internal struggles reveal the anxiety and ferment that pre-
sage a paradigm shift. It is all there-the ad hominem arguments, 0 the
effort to have it both ways, accusations of straying from holy truth, 3' a
24 See Delgado, supra note 21, at 383-86; see generally STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No
SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH, AND IT'S A GOOD THING, Too (1994).
25 See, e.g., MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND (1993); Kent Greenawalt,
Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech? 42 RUTGERS L. REv. 287 (1990).26 MATSUDA ET AL., supra note 25.
27 Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431.28See Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).29 See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Hateful Speech, Loving Communities: Why
Our Notion of "A Just Balance" Changes So Slowly, CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming spring
1994) (arguing that speech and community are inseparable: the way we speak of each
other determines who is in the community and who is not; and the community determines
how its members speak through a set of conventions and common meanings).30 See Yardley, supra note 14; see generally NAT HENTOFF, FREE SPEECH FOR ME-
BUT NOT FOR THEE (1992).31See Hentoff, supra note 30.
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sense of beleaguerment,32 an increase of the decibel level, a resort to
paternalistic arguments 33 ("if those minorities knew their own best inter-
est, they would not be clamoring for .. ."'), and the strategic retreat
34
("how about the narrowest possible speech code?").
What will the new paradigm mean for civil rights and civil liberties
activism and scholarship? Will we not lose a valuable tool for convincing
judges to be equitable and to protect human values if we discard the old
paradigm? The answer today is the same as it would have been if we put
the question to Cohen, Frank, or any of the early legal realist scholars
seventy years ago. They might have replied that misplaced faith in law as
a science could not possibly benefit minorities and the oppressed. They
might have replied that understanding how law really works is a first step
to marshaling that discipline in the service of causes one holds dear. They
might have replied that safety does not lie in pleasant fictions. For these
reasons, those championing equality and human values have nothing to
fear from the new paradigm.
In any event, it is too late to turn back. First Amendment realism has
arrived. The last outpost of formalist thought and faith has fallen. Unless
the ACLU adjusts its thinking to take account of the more nuanced,
skeptical view now emerging, its program, counsels, and pronouncements
will seem more and more the futile products of a backwater of legal
thought.
321d.; Nat Hentoff, Censuring the Censors of Free Speech, CHI. TiM., Sept. 2, 1993,
at 27; Nadine Strossen, Legal Scholars Who Would Limit Free Speech, CHRON. HIGHER
ED., July 7, 1993, at 1, 1-3.33 Yun & Delgado, supra note 23 (analyzing four such arguments).34See Strossen, supra note 1, at 155-56. On the judiciary's somewhat tortured effort
to come to grips with hate speech and hate crime, compare R.A.V v. City of St. Paul, 112
S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (tolerating cross-burning) with Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194
(1993) (permitting sentence enhancement for racially motivated crimes) and two recent
Canadian Supreme Court decisions, Regina v. Butler, 89 D.L.R. 4th 449 (1992) (upholding
an antipornography law in face of objection that it limited speech, protected by the
Canadian charter) and Regina v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (upholding a federal
hate-speech law in face of similar objection).
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